It would be hard to find a better symbol of media repression in Africa than Eskinder Nega. The veteran Ethiopian journalist and dissident blogger has been detained at least seven times by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government over the past two decades, and was put back in jail on September 14, 2011, after he published a column calling for the government to respect freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and to end torture in prisons.

HARGEISA — HARGEISA — President Ahmed Mohamed Silaanyo ordered an emergency meeting of both Houses of parliament on Thursday following the declaration of semi-autonomous state within Somaliland by tribal leaders in Taleeh in Sool region.

The president is to convene army chief, police commissioner, speakers of both Assembly and defense minister to discuss ways to handle the outcome of the tribal conference in Taleeh. Some Dhulbahante clan elders and armed separatist tribal militants meeting in the disputed Sool region recently declared the formation of tribal state. The Somaliland government said it will not tolerate Somaliland to become another Somalia where the list of semi-autonomous regions are growing by the day.

The decision of the president to putting before the joint session of Somaliland parliament is not clear but it seems that military action is the last resort for the government of Somaliland to save the country from disintegrating into smaller states. There are reports indicating that Somaliland National Army has been put into state of alert. Moreover, Somailand Minister of Defense Mr. Ahmed Ali Adami has told the media today that his administration made the biggest blunder of giving the go ahead tribal gathering in Taleeh dubbed Khaatumo two. Majority of the audience and delegates that are attending the Taleeh conference are said to have traveled through airports in Hargeisa and Berbera. Previously, the Somaliland government was told by the organizers of the conference that the Taleeh conference was not a political conference but rather clan gathering.

Mr. Adami, Somaliland’s Defense Minister added that the attendees of the tribal conference arrived in Somaliland airports peacefully and managed to travel through Somaliland cities with Somaliland government’s knowledge and giving the green light that the meeting should go ahead as planned.

It is also reported that a tribal militant based in Taleeh which is currently providing security to the conference were recently integrated into the Somaliland national army. The extraordinary sitting is due to take place on Saturday January 14th. The Dhulbahante clan are divided over the declaration and there are fears the conference will turn violent which could destabilize the region.

New York, January 13, 2012– The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the recent spate of arrests of independent reporters in the semi-autonomous republic ofSomaliland. 

With the exception of very few personalities, TFG officials never attempted to justify in public the need to adopt the 4.5 discrimination clause under the current or under the proposed constitution of the country. Nor did we have the illusion that we would get a favorable reaction from them, because, at one time or another, most of them were the architects of this unfortunate disappointment in the first place.

Many others in the regime silently allowed this provision to crawl, from one conference to another, in the hope that it would eventually take off. Behind the scenes, the usual few, even claimed that those who complain against the 4.5 discrimination clause twisted the argument because the plaintiffs/victims got more than their fair share under the majority/minority rule and should keep quiet and accept their inevitable destiny as subordinates. But we did expect that the educated elite, because of their exposure to what is sustainable and what is fair and healthy for the nation, would use their education to reject this vice, not only in the interest of those who are alienated, but also in the interest of peace and stability for all of Somalia.

It is in the context of the unending dispute over rights to equal representation and the failure of the Garowe Conference of December 21-23, 2011 to recognize these rights that we will examine the views of someone who is very familiar with the political struggle in Somalia since 2000, by his own admission. We have no less than Professor Baadiyow (1), PHD in Modern Islamic History from McGill University and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Mogadishu University, Somalia. To the extent that human effort is always motivated by one thing or another, we have to assume that the professor‟s interview has an objective and that he is trying to reach an audience that speaks English, to whom he must offer an explanation of why the 4.5 discrimination clause is necessary.

Our only problem is that the views that Baadiyow offers directly and indirectly in the interview are not organized in the form of a scholarly paper which addresses the 4.5 clause as a separate subject but is mixed up with the current political issues in the country. Hence, we have to follow him as he answers the questions, wherever he takes us, and put the validity of his statements to the test against the background of a nation. Along the way, we will pull out the contradictions, misrepresentations, the misleading statements that he makes, and his fragmented views, all part of the deal to hold him to ordinary standards of fairness in the presentation of his arguments.

But first, let me say that for those readers who are not well versed in Somali politics, the 4.5 discrimination clause establishes that the society is divided into three classes: those who have full rights to representation (100%), those who have half rights to representation (the 0.5 group), and those who have no rights to representation (the 0.0 group). It was first introduced at the Mbigathi Conference of 2004, and then Djibouti 2008, for the purpose of appeasing the warlords. Second, we have to keep in mind that the questions of the reporter as well as the answers given by Baadiyow were prepared in advance, edited, and finalized. Both had the opportunity and the time to produce a well researched document. Hence, there can be no excuse for overlooking the most fundamental aspects of the Somali crisis.

When asked whether the Garowe Conference of December 21-23, 2011 was concluded with an agreement that can satisfy the Somali people, Baadiyow recognizes that there are problems associated with the Conference but advances the theory that the current conflict in the Parliament “may reflect negatively on the spirit of the conference” (1), down playing all other major issues on the table. For instance, the Garowe Conference expanded the meaning of the 4.5 discrimination clause to include more clans in the alienated group. In shaping the future of the country, the Garowe Conference consolidated the role of the alliance of stakeholders, namely the TFG, Puntland, and Galmudug. To put the matter in prospective, if

there are 100 clans in the country, only 3 clans would have the status to sit, set the rules of the game, and indirectly determine members of the Legislative Assembly, House of Elders, choose the police and army officers, share whatever comes into the coffers of the government, and decide the future of the country. The rest will have to languish in their new status as subordinates.

In front of this fiasco, to which he is silent, Baadiyow feels that he has to say something and fills in the gaps with the usual standard language, such as the suspicion that affects the players, the difficulties associated with the implementation, lack of transparency, and the monopoly that the signatories may hold on the process. Other than these typical arguments, he does not see anything else. For instance, he does not see, or does not want to see for reasons that we do not know, or maybe he never expected that people would take him to task on his failure to notice the impending uproar over the changing political landscape in the country, almost similar to the Shia/Sunni dichotomy.

When asked whether the Garowe Conference was unique, Baadiyow gives us an account of the history behind the Garowe Conference, a preferred and often repeated theme throughout the interview, and calls it “a replica of the Djibouti Conference which was driven by civil society in 2000… later manipulated by the armed groups (Kenya 2004 and Djibouti (2009).” (1) Then adds that all these conferences evolved because “mechanisms and processes for traditional power sharing democracy were established which suit the Somali society in the absence of organized political parties. The formula of 4.5 was adopted and institutions were built based on that formula.” [sic] According to Baadiyow, traditional power sharing, a sugar coated name for the clan quota system, made the process democratic and that the 4.5 quota system is just as democratic as a multi party system. My friends, what is this if it is not a new definition of democracy. One wonders whether Baadiyow ever read, and if he read whether he understood, while he was in the land of democracy, the basic tenets of democracy and whether he ever talked to members of the alienated groups and how they say the question of unequal rights to representation.

It is evident that the interviewer is trying to manipulate Baadiyow into saying that the Somali people will find in the Garowe Conference what they were looking for. In fact, Baadiyow painfully grapples with the question and offers that the “signed (Garowe) principles … (are) a positive shift from the empowering armed groups.” In other words, when compared to the system dictated by the armed groups, the traditional power sharing system is positive, as if the traditionalists, that is the clan chiefs and notables are one bloc and the warlords are another bloc. This is a false distinction and a misleading one because in reality the warlords are nothing more than the bad apples, the bad guys, who do the dirty work for the warring clans. The warlords draw their militia from the clan and every warring clan has several warlords who protect the position of the clan within the system. Warlordism is what the clan uses to secure its share of the spoils and when necessary what stands up to defend the clan from other encroaching clans. By recognizing the clan quota system as a preferable choice, Baadiyow picks a lower standard, a lower bar, against which he measures the warlord system. According to Baadiyow, there are only two choices on the table; either we accept the clan quota system, or we accept the warlord system. As if we did not use the clan quota system over the past 20 years of abuse and failure.

Yet, after telling us that the real choice on the table is between warlordism and the clan quota system, Baadiyow says that the “signing of the principles is good but is not enough if the implementation process is not seen as fair and transparent, capable of producing legitimate national institutions.” In light of how the Garowe Conference expanded the meaning of the 4.5 discrimination clause to include many more clans in the alienated groups, I do not know if Baadiyow realizes what he is saying. Either he thinks that the alienated clans are dumb or maybe something else is going on here. How can clans, whose rights to equal representation at all levels of the political establishment were taken away from them, see the process as being fair? And to make matters worse, Baadiyow hints that because the Somali people are tired and suffering, it is either Garowe, or …

After making a strong statement that the planned 225 members of parliament will be selected on the basis of the 4.5, the interviewer turns to Baadiyow for his recommendation. Baadiyow repeats the same strong statement that the 225 members of parliament would be based on the 4.5 clause but adds that because the “Kenya Conference of 2004 agreed on 275 PMs and the second Djibouti Conference of 2009 doubled the number to 550 MPs, …the 225 is quite good because … it has historical precedence and clans have already divided among themselves.” Who is dividing the 225 seats among themselves? Since when did the fraudulent ink and papers of Mbigathi and Djibouti constitute a precedence? Whatever happened to the 1960 constitution as a legitimate precedence, if precedence mean anything, of one man one vote? As if the history of the Somali people starts with Mbigathi and Djibouti and that these corrupted conferences override whatever rights the various clans had for centuries.

With respect to the proposed “House of Elders”, Baadiyow avoids telling us something about the purpose and functions for which this body is created for the first time in our history, but chooses to dwell on the sensational question of numbers. He either does not know or does not want to say that the so-called “House of Elders” is essentially the House of Stakeholders, namely the TFG, Puntland, and Galmudug. In fact, Article 2.a, the Garowe Conference stipulates that the upper house, that is another sugar coated name for the House of Elders “shall comprise of members of federal states and regional administrations.” Because of the usual marauding thugs and because there is direct and indirect intervention from certain circles to disrupt the formation of regional administrations, by August 2012, when the “House of Elders” will be sworn, we will most likely see only the TFG, Puntland, and Galmudug clan elders sitting in that body, together with a few selected subordinates. Article 2.e of the same document further establishes that “members of the new Federal Parliament will be nominated by recognized traditional elders.” Recognized traditional elders means the usual instruments of indirect rule who are in the payroll of the TFG, as in the old colonial days. Article 2.e.i of the same document wants that a “15 member …interim Electoral Commission consisting of representative from Somali stakeholders shall evaluate and approve all nominees.” In other words, if the clan chiefs mess up and nominate some strange guys for the parliament, the Bermuda Triangle still has the 15 member Electoral Commission which it has nominated and which it has under its control to reject any nominee that they do not like. Clans approving the representatives of other clans.

Further, the Bermuda Triangle has three control pillars in place to determine who will rule the country from now on. These are the traditional elders under their payroll, the 15 member Electoral Commission under their payroll, and the House of Elders under their payroll and which will set the agenda for the lower house, making the parliament, the representatives of the people, a joke. Going back to 1967, Ibrahim Egal proposed this same House of Elders to bypass the real parliament which he could not control. We must be back to square one.

Another interesting aspect of this interview is the obsession that both the interviewer and Baadiyow have with the question of 4.5 and consequently with the question of “minorities”. The interviewer asks Baadiyow how the 4.5 discrimination clause will “hurt the minorities? Isn‟t it unfair to them?” In appearance, the question sounds to be fair but in reality the interviewer introduces the very familiar majority/minority question into the power sharing equation and wants the reader to understand it that way. The interviewer is trying to establish that each one of the Group 4 holds a majority status, while the 0.5 groups, and the 0.0 groups are a minority, when in reality no such determination was ever made. But these misrepresentations do not interest Baadiyow. In fact, according to his “in depth analysis of the 4.5 formula”, the 0.5 and the 0.0 groups should be happy because “the 4.5 formula shows that it has empowered minority sub clans within the four „majority‟ clans and offered alliances of the so-called smaller clans substantial seats in the parliament, which they otherwise possibly not have acquired in free and fair elections.” Yes, why not, we should be happy because there are some bad guys out there, very well known to our great Professor, who do not want to give anything to the 0.5 and 0.0 groups.

While making this tragic statement, Baadiyow, in his own words, still does not want to give up the other side of the argument “there is no statistical data to back the claim of small and majority clan.” [Sic] As if it is not him but somebody else who is making the claim! Apparently, Baadiyow has poor memory, he does not remember what he said a minute earlier.

Because anything after this tragic statement is repetitive and essentially constitutes an attempt to misrepresent and mislead the reader, I would like to conclude these comments by referring to a very interesting statement that the Baadiyow makes in connection with the possibility that the Roadmap may fall apart. In this regard, he explains that “if the process does not offer an opportunity for full participation and current leadership or foreign actors hijack the process, I expect the Arab spring will be extended to Somalia.” And then adds that “the real problem in Somalia is failing to abide by rules and regulations and … younger Somalis will not accept the continuation of the status quo.”[sic] How should we interpret this strange statement in light of everything else that Baadiyow said above? Why would and why should the people follow laws that are not fair? Maybe Baadiyow is telling us of something to come.

For what it is worth to me and to you, lest you have not seen it before, take note of the following statement; it will give you an idea of where the world is today:

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” – Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N. Article 1.10 December 1948)”
See you next time, doctor,

__________________________________________
Bibliography
1. Baadiyow, Abdurahman. Somalia Report. [Online] December 30, 2011.

Quburo saynisyahano caalamka daraasaad ay ku sameeyeen xaalufka ba’an ee khayraadka Badda Africa loo geysto ayeey ku sheegeen in dhibaatadaas xoogeeda ay ka danbeeyaan Dalalka Reer Galbeedka oo la tagay kallunkii Afrika

Seynisyahada ayaa isku raacay in wadamada reer yurub, shiinaha iyo ruushka ay doomo waaweyn la aadeen woqooyi galbeed ee badweynta Africa iyagoo baabi’inaya kalluunkii badahaas ku jiray oo ay meelaha qaar ay suuliyeen.

Talabaadaasi  waxa ay cuuryaamisay dhaqaalihii dadka reer Africa oo noloshooda ku tiirsaneyd kheyraadka Badda iyagoo bilaabay iskaga haajiraan wadamadooda oo ay qabtaan Yurub isla markaana ay   safar aan shaarci ahayn oo doon ah aadaya yurub, taasina waa cudur daar ay Yurub leedahay iney badbaadiso oo ay siiso magalyo dadka dhibaatada ka soo haajira oo ku soo qulqulaya.

Ale Nodye waa kulluumayste ku dhaqan tuula xagga woqooyi xigta ee Senegal, waxa uu sheegay iney lixdii sanno ee lasoo dhaafay oo uu ka kaluumaysaneyey badda uu ka heli kari waayey kalluun ku filan oo u gooysa wax uu shidaal uga gato doontiisa, dabadeedna uu fursad u helay inuu fuulo oo uu raaco dooni 87 kale oo African ah ay saarnaayeen oo wajahneyd jasiirada Canery iyagoo rajo ka qaba iney yurub safar aan sharci ahayn ku gaaraan.

Ale waxa uu intaa ku daray in safarkaas badda ahaa ee 2006 aanu guul ku dhamaan, isaga iyo rakaabkii kale la xiray oo dib loo soo celiyey, wiil ay ilmo adeero yihiina ku dhintay.
Ale waa 27 sanno jir, waxa uuna damcay in uu mar labaad damco safarkaas isagoo leh. “waxaan ka noqon karaa  halkaas kaluumate, nolosha halkaas wey fiican tahy, halkan badda kalluun malahan”

sannadkii aanu soo dhaafanay 31,000 oo African ah ayaa soo gaadhay jasiirada Canery Island, ku dhawaad 6000 oo qof ayaa ku dhintay oo jaan cirib meel ay dhigeen la waayey sida qaramada midoobay qiyaas ay sameysay ku sheegtay.

Kolka  haddii ay yurub raadisay iney maamusho kalluunkeeda waxa aan sameynay inaan dhoofino mishaakilka kalluunka oo aan si gaar ah u dirnaa Africa, Stev Trenta oo ah agaasimaha fullinta urur arrimaha deegaanka baara oo fadhigiisu yahay London.

Hay’adaha qaramada midoobey kuwooda cunada iy beeraha u qaabilsan ayaa ka deyriyey xaalada nololeed ee dadka woqooyiga Afrika iyo xaaluf ba’an ee loo gaystay kalluunka oo waxa ay hay’ada tiri 75% baaba’ ah oo la gurtay taasina waa arrin halis ah sidaas waxaa tiri ‘United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization”

Daraasaadyo badan oo lagu sameeyey kalluunka ahmiyada uu u leeyahay aadanaha iyo sida sharci darada ah ee loo guranayo oo looga nabbad guurinayo Africa ayaa dood cilmiyeedyo baarintaan lagu sameeyeen Yurub lafteeda sida Ingiriiska iyo faransa.

Wadamada ugu daran ee baaba’a ah oo laguba arkayn wax kalluun ah waa Mauritania iy Senagl oo kalluunka, aargoosatada iyo kheyraadkii kale eber ah sida war bixin 2002 yurub soo saartay lagu sheegay.

Uga yaraan 200,000 oo ruux ayay noloshooda ku tiirsan tahay kalluunka oo dadka gobalka ah, waxaa qeylo dhaan iyo cabasho ka soo yeeraysaa Guinea-Bissau mishaalka la soo dersay warshado kalluun oo ay lahaan jirtay albaabada la isgu laabayaa kadib markii doomihii iyagoo fara maran soo laabadoow bilaabeen oo horeyna doomo badan soo iibsan jirtay sidaas dartooda suuqa ka baxeysa.

Warbixinta ku saabsan xaalufka ba’an ee loo gaysta badaha Africa ayaa qoray qaar ka tirsan wargeysyada reer galbeedka sida tan oo aan ka soo xiganay wargeyska New York Times.

Waxaa dhamaanteen nagu waajib ah in aan xaqiiqda ka sheegno dhamaan lacagaha soo galay Madaxwayne Sheikh shariif oo sida tooska ah bil walba uu u keeni jiray Safiirka Dalka Suudaan iyagoo ugu taka galay in amniga dalka lagu sugo balse aan lacagahaa weligood aan lagu shubin Bangiga dhexe laguna wargelin hayadaha dhaqaalaha dalka sida Xisaabiyaha Guud iyo Hanbtidhowraha qaranka. Dowladda Suudaan

waxay Bil walba bixin jirtay HAL MALYAN IYO MARARKA QAARKOOD HALMAYAN IYO BAR USD$ ah. Lacagtaas oo aan marna lagu bixin meeshii loogu tala galay wax isweydiiyeyna ayan jirin, markii Xildhibaanada qaarkood ay ka hadleyna waa la afjigay dib danbana looma maqal hadal haynteeda. Taa waxaa ka daran ma og tahay waxa lagu sameeyey lacagtii laga qabtay BURCAD BADEEDKA ee Garoonka Aden Cabdulle oo dhaneyd 3.6 (Seddex Malyan iyo Lixboqol oo kun oo doolar iyo Boqol kun oo doolar oo ganaax ahaa oo labada dayaaradood lagu ganaaxay min 50,000 kun USD$ . Aaway lacagtaas halkeyse ku danbeysay sidey bangiga u taashay ayey hal mar libdhatay ama la waayey waxaase la sheegay in lagu qaybsadey 1 malyan oo Formaajo lagu qanciyey inta kalena laba Shariif oo u kala qaatayn Sheikh Shariif oo hantiyey 1Malyan iyo Lix Boqol kun $ kan kalena hal malyan $ ku tagay, mar wax laga warsadey Bangiga dhexe way ka gaabsadeen.

Haddaba waxaa sidoo kale mudan in wax la iska warsado aaway lacagihii soo galay Xukuumaddiik Sharmaarke iyo tii Formaajo oo lagu sheegay in ay ahayd ilaa 85 malyan UAS$. Lacagahaas soo xilliyadii labadaa Raiisul Wazaare oo kala ahaa 52 malyan $ oo ku soo xarootay wakhtigii Sharmaarke Xilligaas oo Waziirka maalliyadda uu ahaa Shariif Xassan, markaas oo lacagaha ugu badan ay soo gashay misna aan wax mishaar ah oo xiriir ah la siinin Ciidanka iyo Baarlamaanka, meesha 33 Malyan $ ay soo gashay xilligii Raiisul Wasaare Formaaje oo wasiirka Maalliyadda uu ahaa Xussein Xalane.

Waxaa intaa dheer maxaa ka jira lacagaha Dekeda ka soo xarooda in si toos ah loooga maamulo Villa Soomaaliya oo Maareeyaha uusan kala xisaabtamin wasaaradda maalliyadda marka laga reebo inta yar ee Canshuurta kala goyska loogu kala qaato dekeda dhexdeeda iyadoo wasaradda Maalliyada waxa ka soo gala ay tahay in yar oo magac u yaal ah.

 

Dadka reer xamarka ama Banaadiriga ah ayaa waxaa la sheegay inay ka xumaadeen ama ay ka soo horjeedaan waxa loogu yeero 4.5 oo ah hab dhaqan wax wada qeybsiga ee ay ku saleysan tahay siyaasada Soomaalida ayagoona sheegay inay jeclaan lahaayeen inay la kulmaan qofkii alifay habkaas si ay wax uga weydiiyaan.

Maxamed Shariif Aboow oo ka mid ah qowmiyadaas reer Banaadiriga oo dhawaantaan arintaas ka hadlay ayaa waxaa uu si kaftan iyo qosol leh uu uga sheekeeyey habkaas oo uuna ku tilmaamey mid ah wax lala yaabo islamarkaana ay tahay arin aan la fahmi karin in dadka qaarkiis lagu tilmaamo inay yihiin dad haaf ama nus ah oo aan dhamayn marka loo fiiriyo dadka kale ee Soomaalida ah, ninkaas oo ka sheekeeyey qiysooyin dhab ah ayaa waxaa uu ku saleeyey sida ay Soomaalidu u xaqireen xaquuqda dadkaas banaadiriga.

Ugu dambeyntiina iyadoo run ahaantii uu habkaas wax ku qeybsiga ee 4.5 uu yahay mid uu mar kasta muran badan ka taagan yahay iyadoona kii ugu dembeeyey uu ahaa shirkii wadatashia ee dhawaantaan lagu qabtey magaaladas Garoowe oo ay madaxdii shirkaas isku mariyeen qodobkaas taas oo keentay inuu dib u dhac ku yimaado shirkaas ayaa hadana waxaad moodaa inkastoo ay Soomaalida badankeed ay u muqdaan kuwo ka soo horjeedo habkaas 4.5 inay hadan markii ay timaado in la badelo habkaas ay dib u gurasho sameeyaan ayagoo ku saleynaayo diidmadooda inysan jirin hab kale oo kaas ka wanaagsaan oo wax loogu qeybin karo Soomaalida.

By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein 

Analysis

30 December 201 - After a lull during autumn, when preparatory work proceeded behind the scenes, the serious business of establishing a permanent constitutional order for the territories of post-independence Somalia began in earnest with the holding of the “Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference” in Garowe, the capital of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland, from December 21-24. The conference resulted in an agreement among the organized political administrations that are participating in the constitution-making process on guidelines for determining Somalia’s political future. Announced as the “Garowe Principles,” the agreement prolonged the transition to a permanent political order for Somalia, which was supposed to be completed by August 2012, until 2016.

It is not surprising that the “transition” has been deferred yet again. In the first place, it is not a “Somali-owned” and certainly not a Somali-determined process; rather, it is the project of the Western “donor”-powers working through the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, which attempts to implement the U.N.S.C.’s mandates. The “donor”-powers/U.N. bankrolls whichever political mechanism(s) in Somalia that it chooses to support. At present, where the “donor”-powers/U.N. will put its money is up in the air, because it has decided to draw back from political involvement in Somalia and, as a consequence, is rushing to impose a political solution. The Garowe meeting is a part of that effort, which is encapsulated in the “Roadmap,” which was devised by U.N.P.O.S. to structure the “transition.”

The problem with the Roadmap process is that it did not take into account the deep political divisions in Somalia that could only be overcome through an internal Somali process of working through the divisions on the ground and in discussions. An imposed rush job could not be expected to succeed. The Garowe Principles show that clearly by instituting what Africa Review appropriately called a “new roadmap” that sets in motion a four-year transitional government to replace the current transitional government that the “donor”-powers/U.N. and regional states engineered in 2004. August 2012 is not the beginning of a permanent political order; it is the inception of a new transition.

What does the new transition accomplish? What made the old Roadmap fail? The second question needs to be addressed first, because its answer reveals the fundamental structure of Somali politics; that is, divisions over the form of a permanent Somali state. The division at the Garowe conference that led to deferring the transition is only one of the deep divisions over the nature of the state among Somali groups, although it is an important one and an indicative one. It was sufficient to derail the original Roadmap process.

The Basis of Representation

The fundamental issue that surfaced at the Garowe conference was the basis of representation within the structure/form of a future Somali state.

The conference was “convened” by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), “hosted” by Puntland, and “facilitated” by U.N.P.O.S. It was attended by the “authorities” that had signed the old Roadmap – the T.F.G., the Transitional Federal Parliament (T.F.P.), Puntland, the semi-autonomous state of Galmudug covering part of the Mudug region south of Puntland, a faction of the AhluSunnaWal-Jama’a (A.S.W.J.) movement from Mogadishu, and U.N.P.O.S.

In advance of the conference, U.N.P.O.S. issued a “Briefing Note on the Constitutional Conference in Garowe and the Roadmap,” which contained its directives for the conference. Calling the conference “another step towards the implementation of the Roadmap,” U.N.P.O.S. said that the conference would discuss and agree on the drafting and adopting process for a permanent constitution to be implemented in August 2012. As it turned out that scenario did not come to pass, because the Somali participants were too divided to carry it through, forcing U.N.P.O.S. to make a desperate attempt to heal the rift, resulting in a new Roadmap – the Garowe Principles.

The conference began on December 21 with a deceptive display of unity by its Somali participants, notably the T.F.G.’s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad; its prime minister, Abdiweli Gas; the T.F.P,’s speaker, Sharif Hassan Sh. Adan; and Puntland’s president, AbdirahmanFarole. All of them agreed in their opening statements that the structure/form of a permanent Somali state should be federal. Only Sh. Sharif anticipated the conflict that loomed ahead, when he said: “The debate could be what type of federal system.”

The latent conflict became manifest on December 22 when a “heated debate,” as the Som-Today website reported, erupted over the basis of representation which would be used for a reformed parliament that, according to the Roadmap, would precede the full formation of a state. The battle lines were between Puntland and the other Somali participants, with the former saying that representation should be based on region and district (political basis) and the latter saying that it should be based on clan (social basis), as it is in the present T.F.P.

The debate over the basis of representation was serious; it would determine the balance of power among clans within a constitutional order. Aclosed source privy to the debate reports that the split was a clan-based resistance of the Hawiye and Rahanweyn clan families against the Darod, which dominates Puntland. The other clans, according to the source, calculated that they would not have enough constituencies under the political formula of representation to counter the Darod, so they defended the old system of clan representation that they calculated gave them an advantage.

By the end of the second day, it became clear that the adversaries were unwilling to move from their positions, which meant that the conference would fail and U.N.P.O.S. would lose control of the transition. Desperate to find a way out of the impasse and save the transition, U.N.P.O.S., as reported by Som-Today, floated a compromise in which parliament would function for four years under the present 4.5 clan representation formula, and then would be replaced by a parliament defined by a new permanent constitution. Som-Today reported that the opposing sides rejected the compromise.

On December 23, the conference broke down when the two sides failed to agree on a communiqué that would issue from the conference. That was U.N.P.O.S.’s nightmare. The conference was extended for an extra day. According to another closed source, U.N.P.O.S. used the time to exert pressure on the adversaries to accept U.N.P.O.S.’s compromise.

The pressure worked and on December 24 the participants signed the Garowe Principles, which follow the U.N.P.O.S. compromise plan.

The Garowe principles are not a compromise in the sense of a give-and-take among positions, but a jamming together of positions, in this case by prescribing an initial phase in which clan representation is in force and a succeeding phase in which regional-district representation takes over, presumably on a permanent basis. Puntland gets a promise and its opponents get a lease on life; anything might happen in four years. The old Roadmap gives way to a new Roadmap; that is, a new “transition.”

The first phase of the new “Roadmap” – the transitional phase – is a new parliament that is to begin to function in June 2012 and will be based on the 4.5 clan representation formula. Its members are to be nominated by “recognized traditional elders assisted by qualified civil society members,” or by existing regional administrations, and “in case the prevailing situation does not allow for universal polling, the parliament will be selected on the basis of constituencies” [as is almost certain to be the case]. In essence, the new transitional parliament recreates the old one, with fewer members than at present. There will be no parties, no elections, and no permanent basis of representation.

The second phase – the promise to Puntland – is the establishment of a “bicameral federal legislature,” with the upper house composed of “federal states and regional administrations.” Neither house is to be based on the 4.5 formula: “the new Federal Constitution shall not include any provisions using the 4.5 formula and shall not be amended to abrogate this stipulation in any manner,” and, after the new transitional parliament’s four-year term expires, the permanent parliament “will be elected through universal polling of one person one vote.”

Having formulated and engineered its compromise, the “donor”-powers/U.N. had to accept a new four-year transition, not only to satisfy the participants opposed to Puntland, but because Puntland’s model of federalism could not be implemented until regional authorities were formed in southern and central Somalia, where they do not presently exist.

The new Roadmap leads to Puntland’s model of federalism, and the Garowe Principles are supposed to “guide and direct finalization of the draft constitution and the process of ending the transition.” That said Puntland has four years to make the new Roadmap stick and its opponents have four years to try to derail its process. What does the new “transition” accomplish for the “donor”-powers/U.N.? They are the ones who have driven the process to where it is now.

The Transition Renewed

Obviously, what the “donor”-powers/U.N. accomplished at the Garowe conference was to renew the transition, which is the opposite of what it wanted in its rush to fabricate a “permanent” constitutional order in “Somalia,” so that it could diminish its commitment to “Somalia.”

How and why that happened can be traced directly to the lack of political will on the part of the “donor”-powers/U.N., which refuses to take operative responsibility for a process that it has engineered and purports to “facilitate” (direct).

In the case of the Garowe conference, the lack of political will manifests in a refusal to stand up to Puntland and not allow it to determine Somalia’s future political dispensation in advance of the Roadmap’s constitutional process; and a consequent placating of the opposition to Puntland by extending the transition and ending the old Roadmap and putting a new “transitional” Roadmap in its place. In short, the “donor”-powers/U.N. was not willing to use its diplomatic resources to save its own Roadmap.

The question now becomes what the “donor”-powers/U.N. will do next. It could settle in for four years of “transition,” but it does not want that. It could pretend that the “transition” is a phase of the permanent dispensation and deal with its institutions as though they formed a state organization in the international system. It could withdraw its commitment to the new “transition” and pursue a policy of balkanization. It is too early to tell which way the “donor”-powers/U.N. will go. The “donor”-powers had been holding on to the Roadmap process as a better alternative to balkanization, but now they are in the position of “facilitating” a Roadmap that is no longer their own and even more importantly drags on for four more years. Their commitment to it becomes more problematic – an initial failure of will leads to a jammed-together “compromise” that deflates will even more. The probability of balkanization increases.

Will the “donor”-powers/U.N. be willing to see through the difficult process of forming regional states along the lines of Puntland in southern and central Somalia? Will it use its diplomatic resources and political expertise and political facilitation to support regional federalism? Does the “donor”-powers/U.N. have the will to take operative responsibility for the new Roadmap? No one else can do it. Or will the Garowe Principles be scuttled, by-passed, or ignored? If that happened, Puntland would be drawn closer to declaring independence along the lines of Somaliland.

It is important to remember that the dispute between Puntland and the other participants is only one of the deep divisions over the nature of the state among Somali groups. There is the status of Somaliland, the place of Islam/Islamism, and the proliferation of incipient and competing regional administrations, local administrations and aspirational authorities, some of them backed by Ethiopia and Kenya. The divisions over the nature of the state are existential, not theoretical. It only took one of them to tear up the old Roadmap. The Garowe conference only represented some of the Somali political forces. Even in that restricted set, U.N.P.O.S. could not engineer a synthetic compromise. What if the Garowe conference had been more inclusive and the other conflicts over the nature of a future state in Somalia had surfaced? How would U.N.P.O.S. have handled that?

Forging a political order for the territories of post-independence Somalia, if it comes about, will be difficult work.The “donor”-powers/U.N. has never faced up to that judgment, especially since the beginning of 2011 when it tried to force a quick transition. The gap between Somalia’s political complexity and its political needs, and the simplistic self-serving expedients of the “donor”-powers/U.N. is so wide that it guarantees failure for any of its designs, unless its aim is to keep “Somalia” in political limbo in perpetuity. And that has also become a possibility.

When the driver has abandoned the wheel, the passengers try to seize it. At present, Puntland is faced with having to try to make the Garowe Principles stick. The opposing forces are faced with having to try to overturn the Garowe Principle. Both sides will try to use the “donor”-powers/U.N. to their respective advantages. The only way to avoid that scenario is for the opposing sides to reach a genuine synthetic compromise, which requires that they trust each other. And the same goes for all the other deep political divisions over the nature of a future Somali political order.

The “donor”-powers/U.N. suffers from a lack of will coupled with a wish to control.That is a political pathology. The Somalis suffer from a lack of trust, and that is not to say that it is not well grounded. How to build trust among one another is a task for Somalis, if they care to undertake it.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago   weinstem@purdue.edu

MUQDISHO:- Gudoomiyaha gobalka Banaadir ahne duqa magaalada muqdisho Maxamuud Axmed Nuur Tarsan ayaa si kulul udhaleeceyay hananka 4.5 ee ay kudhisan tahay dowlada KMG ah lana filayo in mida cusub lagu soo dhiso. 

Isagoo shir jaraa id kuqabtay Muqdisho waxaa uu sheegay Tarsan in qaabkani uu kala saro marinayo beelaha soomalida taasina ay tahay wax aan loo dul qaadan Karin .

Dhaqankan ayuu kutilmaamay mid kahor imaanaanaya mirihii iyo hal gankii 13-kii SYL.

Waxaa uu soo hadal qaaaday beelaha banaadiriga oo kujira barka waxa lagu tilmaamo waxaana uu sheegay in ay taasi tahay qalad weyn oo beeshas laga galay. 

“Hananka 4.5 waxaa uu leeyahay Beesha reer Banaadiriga waxaa ay kujiraan barka taasi waa qalad waa xaqdaro waa dulmi loo geysanayo beeshasi “ayuu yiri Tarsan.

Godoomiyaha Gobalka banaadir ayaa sheegay in ay adkaan doonto xal laga gaaro arinta Somalia ilaa iyo inta qabiil laleyahay waxaa uu kasareeya qabiil kale .

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmarOVCxkp8